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Interstate Agencies, Their Tort Dilemmas and a
Federal Solution
Miriam M. Reimel*
INTRODUCTION

The interstate compact, a hybrid between state and federal regulation, has now become a staple of government. With increased
regional problems and interstate dependencies, the compact's structure and uses have expanded. The development, however, has been
accompanied by some legal growing pains, not the least of which is
resolving how control should be balanced between the state and
federal government and shared among the participating states. The
question arises most strikingly when a law of one state differs from
laws of other states involved in the compact, or when a federal law
conflicts with a statute of any of the participating states. Resolving
these dilemmas in ways that recognize the sovereignty of each state,
while maintaining the unity of the participants for their joint purpose, poses complex problems. This article will examine one such
problem-the situation where all but one state in the compact have
abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
BACKGROUND

Formal interstate compacts are formed with congressional consent pursuant to article I of the United States Constitution which
states in relevant part: "No state shall, without the Consent of
Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power . . . ."I This federalist check, first

upheld in Virginia v. Tennessee,I is designed to prevent "the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power
in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States."3 The utility of the provision is
B.A., Gwynedd-Mercy College, 1968; J.D., Temple University, 1974; Associate of Law,
Offices of Jack Sirott, Bristol, Pennsylvania.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.3.
2. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
3.
d. at 519.
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evident where the activity of the compact impinges on interstate
commerce or on the distribution of political power among the
states.' It affords Congress a measure of control over agreements
that yield consequences beyond state lines, yet do not have a national impact.5 Although there are other methods of achieving
multi-state cooperation,' interstate compacts are the most common
and their number continues to increase. 7 Today there are over 160
such compacts.'
Over the years, the interstate compact has been enthusiastically
acclaimed 9 because its unique multi-state structure allows a balancing of conflicting interests on regional problems. Since the scope of
problems addressed by compacts extends beyond the jurisdictional
reach of a single state, state regulation is clearly inadequate. Federal control is often unavailable and inappropriate since the issues
involved are not of national concern. A regional solution is called
for, and the interstate compact-embodying regional interests, regional wisdom and regional pride-is the handy remedy. 0
Interstate compacts were initially used for one-dimensional issues
such as boundary disputes, for which they were quite satisfactory
since land settlement obviated the need for any administration by
the compact agency." Compacts proliferated and later became more
4. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694-95 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter & Landis]. But see Engdahl, Characterizationof InterstateArrangements: When Is a Compact Not
a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 63, 101 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Characterizationof Interstate Arrangements].
5. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 4, at 695.
6. Other means of achieving multi-state cooperation include uniform laws, reciprocal
legislation, and informal agreements. See Characterizationof InterstateArrangements, supra
note 4.
7. Thirty-six compacts were instituted between 1783 and 1920; between 1921 and 1955,
65 were added; between 1955 and 1965, 29 more compacts were created. W. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS INTHE POLITICAL PROCESS 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BARTON].
8. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS, 1783-1970, at V (1971).
9. For one of the most enthusiastic endorsements of interstate compacts see Frankfurter
& Landis, supra note 4.
10. Id. at 708. Although the article by Frankfurter and Landis was written over 50 years
ago, the use of the interstate compact as a means of solving regional problems is, in today's
world, just as appropriate. Two current authorities have described the use of the compact as
"a means of getting the existing federal and state apparatus to address itself to intergovernmental problems in concert, with the intergovernmental agency as a specialized staff resource
for the purpose." Zimmermann & Wendell, Interstate Compacts, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES
1976-77, at 575 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zimmermann & Wendell].
11. For a detailed summary of the early uses of compacts see Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 4, at 695-708.
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complex in response to rapidly changing lifestyles. Waste problems,
industrial development, and other matters associated with population growth required a degree of cooperation which would have been
practically impossible without regional administration through interstate compacts.'" The development of compacts advanced dramatically with the passage of the Port of New York Authority Compact of 1921' 3 and the Colorado River Compact of 1928.'1 These were
among the first interstate compacts to establish ongoing commissions or agencies to administer, regulate, and execute the terms of
a regional compact.
At first, the federal government's only involvement with interstate compacts was simply to provide its stamp of approval. With
the formation of the Potomac, 5 Upper Colorado River Basin,'" and
Ohio River 7 compacts, the federal government assumed a role similar to that of a respected limited partner-a passive participatory
member who added prestige and clout to the compact. Federal involvement increased markedly with the passage of the Delaware
River Basin Compact (DRBC) in 1961.'1 The commission formed by
12. Modem developments have increased the potential for heightened use of interstate
compacts since "in many instances the most appropriate geographic areas for administration
of some of the programs may be somewhere between State and Nation." Zimmermann &
Wendell, supra note 10, at 575. See Grad, Federal-StateCompact:A New Experiment in CoOperative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 825, 850-55 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Grad].
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 to -35 (West 1963), and N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS 65 §§ 64016423, 6451-6468 (McKinney 1961), consented to by Congress, 42 Stat. 174 (1921), as amended,
42 Stat. 822 (1922).
14. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-571 (1956), and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 175 (West 1969), and COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1973), and NaD. REv. STAT. § 538.010 (1976), and N.M. STAT. ANN. §
75-34-3 (1953), and UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-12a-1 to -3 (1953), and Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-505 to 506 (1957), consented to by Congress, 42 Stat. 171 (1921) and 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 617(b) (1970).
15. D.C. CODE §§ 7-1501 to -1502 (1973), and MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 407-408 (1957),
Ind PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 741-743 (Purdon 1959), and VA. CODE § 28.1-203 (1950), and
W. VA. CODE 99 29-1C-I to -5 (1973), consented to by Congress, 54 Stat. 748 (1940), codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 567(b) (1970).
16. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 45-581 (1956), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-62-101 to -106 (1973),
and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-34-3 (1953), and UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-63-9 to -12 (1953), and
WYO. STAT. § 41-507 (1957), consented to by Congress, 63 Stat. 31 (1949), codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 617 (1970).
17. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 117-121 (Smith-Hurd 1973), and IND. CODE §§ 13-5-6-1
to -5 (1973), and Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.190 (1969), and N.Y ENVm. CONSERV. LAW § 21-0301
to -0317 (McKinney 1969), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6113.01 -.04 (Page 1967), and PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 916.1 (Purdon 1959), and W. VA. CODE § 29-1D-I (1976), consented to
by Congress, 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
18. DEL. CODE tit. 7, §§ 6501-6511 (1974), and N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:11D-1 to -110 (West
Supp. 1976-1977), and N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 801 (McKinney 1969), and PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 815.101 (Purdon 1975), consented to by Congress, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
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that compact was the first in which the federal government was an
active voting partner with rights equal to the participating states.
This new federal participation marked a turning point in the development of the compacts.' 9
Interstate compacts have often had to face thorny problems of
administration. If a member state violates a compact or fails in its
responsibilities, how and where is suit brought, and if participant
states have irreconcilable laws, which state's laws prevail? 0 The
legal complexities become critical when a plaintiff alleges that an
agency created by an interstate compact has been negligent. If the
compact includes a state such as Pennsylvania, which retains the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, it must be determined whether
sovereign immunity can be raised by the agency as a complete defense to the suit, even if no other member state recognizes that
defense. Exploration of this troublesome problem will provide the
nucleus for the remainder of this article. As the factual setting for
the discussion is unveiled, it should be remembered that the sovereign immunity issue being examined is only illustrative of the kinds
of complex litigation with which state and federal courts must grapple as the number of interstate compacts increases.
19. See Grad, supra note 12. While federal participation does not resolve problems which
occur when participants in a compact fail to agree on an issue, it provides an impetus towards
compelling cooperation. When, for example, a forty-six month drought causing critical water
shortages materialized in 1965 along the Delaware River Basin, chaos and selfishness prevailed until the federal government interceded. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and
Delaware had formed the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) for the purpose of
amicably resolving water basin problems, a source of previous litigation. See New Jersey v.
New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); F. BIRD, THE
PORT OF NEW YORK AuTHORITY 7-8 (1949) (asserting that disputes over water regulation led
to the formation of the Port Authority). In 1965, emergency plans were formulated to deal
with the water scarcity caused by the drought. New York City, in defiance of a court order
enjoining diversions, New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 996-1000 (1954), appropriated
water for its own use. Prohibitory orders from the court-appointed "river master" were in
vain. Public DRBC hearings were called, emergency meetings of the DRBC participants were
held, and a modification of the ordered diversions was attempted. See Minutes of the Meeting
of DRBC, July 7, 1965 (Trenton, N.J.). Nevertheless, the crisis continued.
The federal government stayed in the background until President Johnson promised federal
aid. After federal intervention and promise of aid, the states began to cooperate. It is doubtful
that the practical force behind the compact language, or its moral suasion, would have
resolved the crisis. The economic clout of the federal government provided the needed impetus for solution of the drought emergency.
20. For criticism of the limitations of interstate compacts, see F. ZIMMERMANN & M.
WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, at 110-11 (1951); BARTON, supra note 7, at 4.
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A

FACTUAL SETTING

The Delaware River forms part of Pennsylvania's border with
New Jersey. The agencies which control the river are the Delaware
River Port Authority (DRPA) and the Delaware River Joint Toll
Bridge Commission (DRJTBC).2 1 Each of these agencies was established by congressionally approved interstate compacts" and each
includes as members Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 3 Each compact
contains the statement that the agency is a "public corporate instrumentality" of the two states 4 which has the power "to sue and
be sued."25 Both agencies operate and maintain bridges without
reference to either state's legislative approval.26 The bridges are
largely self-sustaining; tolls and bond issues provide the revenues. 27
Neither agency can pledge a state's credit or create any debt against
either state." Indeed, the only significant financial dependence occurs in the operation of the Bridge Commission's free bridges which
are funded by equal shares from New Jersey and Pennsylvania.29
Yet, both of these agencies have, when sued in tort, successfully
raised the defense of sovereign immunity as a complete bar to recovery for damages by an injured party2.
STATE LAW

The ubiquitous "sue and be sued" clause has often not been ac21. The discussion is oriented toward an analysis of these agencies. However, these agencies are not in a unique position and many of the problems they face can be seen in similarly
constructed compact bodies.
22. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, 47 Stat. 308 (DRPA); Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 833, §
9, 49 Stat. 1058 (DRJTBC).
23. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. I, 47 Stat. 309 (DRPA Compact); Act of August 30,
1935, ch. 833, § 9, 49 Stat. 1059 (DRJTBC Compact).
24. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. 1, 47 Stat. 309 (DRPA Compact); Act of August 30,
1935, ch. 833, § 9, 49 Stat. 1059 (DRJTBC Compact).
25. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. IV(b), 47 Stat. 310 (DRPA Compact); Act of August
30, 1935, ch. 833, § 9, art. 11(b), 49 Stat. 1060 (DRJTBC Compact).
26. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. I, 47 Stat. 309 (DRPA Compact); Act of August 30,
1935, ch. 833, § 9, 49 Stat. 1059 (DRJTBC Compact).
27. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art IVO) 47 Stat. 311 (DRPA Compact); Act of August
30, 1935, ch. 833, § 9, art. II(i) 49 Stat. 1060 (DRJTBC Compact).
28. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. VII, 47 Stat. 314 (DRPA Compact); Act of August
30, 1935, ch. 833, § 9, art. IV, 49 Stat. 1062 (DRJTBC Compact).
29. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:8-1 to -16 (West 1963), and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3278
(Purdon 1961).
30. See notes 46-85 and accompanying text infra.
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cepted at face value. Many state agencies whose empowering instruments provide that they can "sue and be sued" have been shielded
from suit in tort,3 but not from contract liability.2 Thus, the mere
existence of a "sue and be sued" clause does not necessarily guarantee the ability to bring a suit against an interstate agency. The
clause's interpretation may depend on the jurisdiction in which the
action is brought. In some cases-such as where the plaintiff, the
agency, and the accident are all located in the same state-there
may be no choice of forum for the suit. Where, on the other hand, a
case involves contacts with more than one state, the plaintiff might
have the option of choosing a forum that will look favorably upon
3
his case. 1
If one of the Delaware River commissions were being sued in tort
and the plaintiff brought his suit in a New Jersey state court, his
cause of action could be presented; the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act34 allows all "public entities," including the two Delaware River
agencies, to be sued under limited conditions.3 5 If the plaintiff were
to bring his cause of action in a Pennsylvania court, however, he
faces a variety of potential impediments. He initially encounters the
problem of which Pennsylvania court will hear his case. Under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, suits against "the Commonwealth" can
only be brought "in such courts and in such cases as the legislature
may by law direct. '3 The state's Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act 3
31. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has asserted that the "sue and be sued" clause was
not instituted as a "general waiver of immunity" in negligence suits, and has supported its
decision by citing similiar holdings in several other states. Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 615, 182 A.2d 199, 201 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 128-29, 209
A.2d 810, 814 (1965); R.G. Packard Co. v. Palisades Interstate Park, 240 F. 543 (S.D.N.Y.
1916). While the legal reason for the distinction is not clear, the practical rationale is obvious:
if recovery were barred in a contract action, many suppliers and contractors would be unwilling to deal with the agency. See Note, The Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARv. L. REv. 714 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HAIv. Note].
33. Ordinarily, a court will accept jurisdiction of a case; the general forum non conveniens
rule is that a state will refuse to exercise jurisdiction only "if it is a seriously inconvenient
forum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the
plaintiff." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971). The general policy is that
a court usually should not disturb a plaintiff's choice of forum "except for weighty reasons."
Id., Comment c. Moreover, the general rule is not jurisdictional except in a few specialized
cases. Id., Comment g; see id., Comment i.
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-1 (West Supp. 1976-1977).
35. Id. §§ 59:1-2 to 2-10.
36. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.101-.510 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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declares that "the Commonwealth" can be sued only in commonwealth court. 8 Thus, for jurisdictional purposes there must be a
threshold consideration of whether the agency is "the Commonwealth." The Act's definition of "Commonwealth" does not readily
answer the question; "Commonwealth" is defined to include
"departments, departmental administrative boards and commissions, officers, independent boards or commissions, authorities and
other agencies of this Commonwealth."39 Explicitly excluded from
the definition are "any political subdivision, municipal or other
local authority, or any officer or agency of any such political subdivision, municipal or local authority.""
Since neither the Pennsylvania Constitution nor the Appellate
Court Jurisdiction Act explicitly determines whether a multi-state
body is an agency "of this Commonwealth," the courts are immediately plunged into the problem of ascertaining the interstate entity's
status. More importantly, if a court decides that the interstate
agency is an agency "of this Commonwealth," then it seems to have
also decided the core issue of whether the agency will be protected
from suit by sovereign immunity. Arguably, suit could be allowed
to proceed initially in the commonwealth court by interpreting the
"sue and be sued" compact language without determining whether
the agency is protected by sovereign immunity, on the rationale that
an agency can be considered an agency of the state for one purpose
but not for another.' The Pennsylvania Sureme Court, however, has
not followed this metaphysical bisection of closely related questions,
and has chosen to combine the question of "which court" with the
issue of sovereign immunity and decide them both as matters of
procedure .4

The very act of labeling these questions "procedural," however,
causes certain pivotal arguments to be foreclosed. The "procedural"
label mandates that, under traditional conflict of laws principles,
Pennsylvania law is to be applied without any analysis of the facts.43
38. Id. § 211.401(a).
39. Id. § 211.102(a)(2).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Levine v. Redevelopment Auth., 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 382, 385, 333 A.2d 190,
192 (1975) (municipal authorities may be state agencies in some cases and local agencies in
other situations).
42. See, e.g., Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962)
(lower court to decide the issue of sovereign immunity as a matter of procedure).
43. "Procedurally, the rules of procedure of the forum are controlling. The party who
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If the court were to treat sovereign immunity as a separate substantive issue, the forum state, Pennsylvania, could use a conflicts analysis to determine which state's law should apply. 4 In effect, by
labeling both matters procedural, the suability of an interstate
agency may be decided against the plaintiff without being squarely
addressed by the court. It seems inequitable for a choice of laws
analysis, which allows for a much broader appraisal of the factual
setting involved in the suit, to be foreclosed at the outset by labeling.
Yet, even if the issue could be addressed from the perspective of
a conflicts analysis, a plaintiff's problems would not subside. A
court balancing the relative "policies and interests" or "contacts"
of the participating states, could find the policies and interests
shifting from case to case, and the sovereign immunity question
would be no more certain than it is now. Or, relying solely on a
territorial approach, the court could decide a case favorably to one
party if the accident occurs on one side of the bridge, and against
that party if the accident occurs on the other side of the bridge.
Thus, even a conflicts approach leaves us with an uncertain, shifting
body of law.
Regardless of the approach taken, in order to proceed, the court
is left with the question of making a determination whether a multistate public corporation, of which Pennsylvania is a member, is "the
Commonwealth" or its agent. Language that states that the agency
is a "public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey,"" found in both the
DRPA and DRJTBC compacts, could be read to indicate that the
interstate agency is the agency of each state. Alternatively, the
language could be read to identify a separate entity-a Pennsylvania-New Jersey agency-removed from either state. Certainly,
brings the action subjects himself to the procedural rules of the action State .
International Paper Co. v. Midvale-Heppenstall Co., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 627, 633 (C.P. Allegh. Co.
1973). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 123-136 (1971) (laws of forum state
govern procedural questions).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). Such conflicts
principles and factors to be considered would inqlude the situs of the accident, see Elston
v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966), a weighing of the complex
"contacts" that each state has with the action, see Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d
854 (1970), and the balancing of the policies and interests of each state, see Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
45. Act of June 14, 1932, ch. 258, art. I, 47 Stat. 309 (DRPA Compact); Act of August 30,
1935, ch. 833, § 9, 49 Stat. 1069 (DRJTBC Compact).
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a distinction can be drawn between "an agency of the Commonwealth," the language contained in the Commonwealth's Appellate
Court Jurisdiction Act, and words which would explicitly indicate
a multi-state agency. To hold that such interstate bodies are "the
Commonwealth" would mean that every agency of which Pennsylvania is a member might be considered an agency of the Commonwealth. This interpretation is not logical; the result would be that
every state member of the compact could characterize the interstate agency as an agency of its state when it would serve the state's
purpose to do so." States whose treasuries are guarded by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity may be quite reluctant to categorize
a multi-state agency as something other than an entity which is
protected by sovereign immunity. 7 Thus, they may be enticed to
look past the logic of the characterization and decide that "agency
of the Commonwealth" includes multi-state agencies.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A "sue and be sued" clause in a compact does not automatically
permit a lawsuit to proceed;48 the Pennsylvania courts have ruled
46. A number of arguments can be raised both for and against asserting that an agency
formed by an interstate compact is an agency of the state. It can be asserted that a Pennsylvania "agency" must operate purely within state lines and under the control of the Pennsylvania legislature alone; since a multi-state public corporation neither operates within Pennsylvania alone nor under the sole control of the legislature, it is not an agency "of the
Commonwealth." Other arguments to differentiate interstate compact agencies from onestate Pennsylvania agencies include: (1) a multi-state public corporation must adhere to the
constitutions of each membership state-not merely Pennsylvania's alone; (2) suits involving
the corporation can be brought in any membership state-not just in Pennsylvania; and, (3)
citizens from all membership states control its activities-not just Pennsylvania citizens.
On the other hand, there are several arguments in favor of concluding that multi-state
public corporations are "the Commonwealth." It could be asserted that the entity has been
delegated authority to perform certain functions by the Commonwealth and that the body
therefore is answerable to the Commonwealth for these tasks; that the agency is an arm of
the state, and that the compact language does refer to the agency as "a public corporation
instrumentality" of Pennsylvania and other state participants. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, in regard to the DRJTBC, there is a certain financial link
between Pennsylvania and the interstate agency: its free bridges are funded equally by
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Funding is authorized by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3278
(Purdon 1961).
47. The philosophical rationale for sovereign immunity dates back nearly two centuries
to the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788), in which it
was decided that "it is better an individual should sustain an injury than that the public
should suffer an inconvenience." Id. at 362.
48. See notes 31-42 and accompanying text supra.
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that such a clause does not by itself waive a defense of sovereign
immunity. 9 Resolution of this issue is entwined in the vast and
controversial body of law which was spawned when sovereign immunity was adopted in Pennsylvania in 1788. 50 Since then, a variety
of formulas, standards, and policy arguments have evolved to determine whether the entity being sued stands in the shoes of the state
and is therefore immune from suit. 5' Despite strong and frequent
criticism,52 the standard of whether an agency's function is governmental or proprietary53 remained an analytic touchstone through
the years.54 Frequently, this imprecise standard was coupled with an55
inquiry of whether the body was an "instrumentality" of the state,
a query whose determination was generally made through the use
of agency principles.
Some courts have refused to unthinkingly denominate multi-state
compact commissions "agencies of the Commonwealth." A landmark case dealing with the identity of a compact agency was Souder
v. PhiladelphiaPolice Pension Fund Association,5 where the plaintiff's decedent, a Philadelphia policeman, quit the force to enter
employment with the DRJTBC. For ten years subsequent to his
departure from the police force, he received his police pension.
Later, he was notified that he would no longer be eligible for the
49. Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 615, 182 A.2d 199, 202 (1962).
50. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788).
51. See generally HARV. Note, supra note 32.
52. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ. 453 Pa. 584, 592, 305 A.2d 877, 881
(1973); Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School Dist., 393 Pa. 633, 637, 144 A.2d 737, 739
(1958); Boorse v. Springfield Township, 377 Pa. 109, 113, 103 A.2d 708, 711 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
53. The distinction between proprietary and governmental functions is one between acts
which are done in a business or ownership role, such as supplying water, furnishing gas,
providing licenses and grants, operating a public playground or maintaining and managing
a park, and those which are performed as functions of government delegated by the state.
The latter category would include furnishing police and fire protection and refuse collection.
Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248, 249-50 & nn.1 & 2, 37 A.2d 18, 19 & nn.1 & 2
(1944).
54. See, e.g., Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973);
Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973); Thomas v. Baird,
433 Pa. 482, 252 A.2d 653 (1969); Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962).
55. See, e.g., Harris v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332, 1336 (3d Cir.
1969); Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 184, 301 A.2d 849, 851 (1973);
Roney v. General State Auth., 413 Pa. 218, 196 A.2d 349 (1964); Rader v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 619, 182 A.2d 199, 204 (1962).
56. 344 Pa. 286, 25 A.2d 191 (1942), overruled, Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d
514 (1962).

1977

Interstate Agencies

pension because of a pension fund bylaw which stipulated that a
policeman's pension would be forfeited if he became employed by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the DRJTBC was not "the state" for purposes of
the police pension fund and that a multi-state public corporation
formed pursuant to a compact was distinct from either of its state
members. 7 In Carver v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge
Commission," a trial court followed the rationale of Souder and held
that the DRJTBC was an entity distinct from the Commonwealth
and therefore could be sued only as a public corporation.59 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the lower court's characterization of the Commission.'"
These cases were not the final word on determining whether a
multi-state agency was an agency of the Commonwealth since their
impact was diminished by a series of public utility cases. The
DelawareRiver Joint Commission Case"'dealt with the right of the
Commission to force relocation of telephone lines without compensation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
"Commission, in this Commonwealth, acts as the agent of the Commonwealth" since portions of the bridge administered by the agency
are part of the Pennsylvania highway system." A similar case,
Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission,6 3 discussed the powers exerted by the Commonwealth's Public Utility Commission over the DRPA, then, without
analysis or regard for the structure of the DRPA, relied simply on
the Delaware River Joint Commission Case. The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated: "In exercising the powers conferred upon it by
the Commonwealth, the Authority acts as the agent of the Commonwealth." The court reasoned that the Authority stands in the
place of the Commonwealth since it was chosen by the state to
57. Id. at 291, 25 A.2d at 194: "Upon the execution of the agreement of July 1, 1931, the
Commission became a distinct entity, separate and apart from either State." The Souder
court made this statement despite a finding that the Commission performed a state function
and acted as an agent of the Commonwealth. Id.
58. 70 Dauph. 114 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
59. Id. at 116.
60. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Carver, 399 Pa. 545, 548, 160 A.2d 425,
427 (1960).
61. 342 Pa. 119, 19 A.2d 278 (1941).
62. Id. at 122, 19 A.2d at 279.
63. 180 Pa. Super. Ct. 315, 119 A.2d 855 (1956).
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construct bridge approaches to Pennsylvania. 4
The Pennsylvania courts have subsequently followed the rationale of the utility cases rather than the holdings of Souder and Carver in determining the applicability of sovereign immunity in suits
against the interstate compact agencies. In Anderson Appeal, 5 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the DRPA was immune
from liability in an action for consequential damages where the
plaintiff alleged an unauthorized taking of property. In the court's
view, the DRPA was an agency carrying out an executive function
of the state.6 6 The court totally ignored Carver, disapproved statements in Souder, cited the utility cases, and concluded that the Port
Authority exercised "an essential governmental function."" Although it acknowledged that the Authority is controlled by and
responsible to the legislatures and the governors of the two states,
the court failed to find any difference between the Authority and the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, a wholly internal state agency
which it had previously held was "the Commonwealth." 6
The viability of Anderson Appeal as precedent has been rendered
less certain by two subsequent developments. First, since the decision the legislature has passed the Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act, 6 arguably an important indicator of the legislative intent not
to include multi-state corporations in the definition of
"Commonwealth"; certainly, by 1970, interstate agencies were common enough to have been considered and included in the definition
had the legislature desired to do so. That the commissions were not
included, therefore, seems noteworthy. A second development since
Anderson Appeal has been the nationwide movement toward abandonment of the sovereign immunity doctrine. Many states have
recognized its archaic rationale and its inapplicability to modern
government.'°
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has been loath to
64. Id. at 322, 119 A.2d at 858.
65. 408 Pa. 179, 182 A.2d 514 (1962).
66. Id. at 182, 182 A.2d at 515.
67. Id. at 184, 182 A.2d at 517.
68. Id.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.101-.510 (Purdon Supp. 1976-1977). See notes 37-40 and
accompanying text supra.
70. See, e.g., Nieting v. Blondel, 235 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1975). See generally Lambert,
Tort Law, 36 A.T.L.A.L.J. 20 (1976); Lambert, Tort Law, 35 A.T.L.A.L.J. 33 (1974).
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shed the doctrine of sovereign immunity.71 The court's position has
been that sovereign immunity is legislatively established by the
Pennsylvania Constitution,7 2 and, hence, is not a common law
theory which can be judicially abrogated. The supreme court has,
however, chipped away at aspects of sovereign immunity. It abolished governmental immunity in Ayala v. PhiladelphiaBoard of
Public Education"with language that took cognizance of the changing politics and times. The court stated that "until the present
action, we have retained the archaic and artificial distinction between tortious conduct arising out of the exercise of a proprietary
function and tortious conduct arising out of exercise of a governmental function."74 The court then declared that there are "no reasons
whatsoever [that] exist for continuing to adhere to the doctrine of
governmental immunity. Whatever may have been the basis for the
inception of the doctrine, it is clear that no public policy considerations presently justify its retention."7 Although the Ayala court
dismissed as impotent many of the same policies that underlie the
sovereign immunity doctrine, the court implied that sovereign immunity was still a viable Pennsylvania doctrine.7 8
Two years later, after upholding the applicability of sovereign
immunity to the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board77 and the
Pennsylvania National Guard, 8 the supreme court held that the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission was no longer protected by sovereign immunity. In Specter v. Commonwealth,7 9 the court admitted that it had erred in ruling that the Turnpike Commission was
identical to the Commonwealth.'" The Specter court analogized the
71. See Freach v. Commonwealth, 370 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. 1977); Specter v. Commonwealth, 462 Pa. 474, 341 A.2d 481 (1975); Brown v, Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d
868 (1973); id. at 572, 305 A.2d at 872 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). But see id. at 580, 305 A.2d
at 875 (Manderino, J., dissenting); Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179,
187, 301 A.2d 849, 853 (1973) (Nix, J., dissenting); Smeltz v. Copeland, 440 Pa. 224, 226, 269
A.2d 466, 468 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Baird, 433 Pa. 482, 485, 252 A.2d
653, 655 (1969) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
72. PA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
73. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
74. Id. at 592, 305 A.2d at 881.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 600-01, 305 A.2d at 885. See Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa.
179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
77. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973).
78. Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
79. 462 Pa. 474, 341 A.2d 481 (1975).
80. Id. at 493, 341 A.2d at 490.
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Turnpike Commission to a political subdivision, comparable to the
governmental entities which were held vulnerable to suit under the
Ayala decision. Moreover, the court indicated that two factors
would be important in determining whether an agency is so closely
aligned with the Commonwealth that it is cloaked with immunity:
whether the interstate body is financially dependent on the Commonwealth,' and whether the agency can make the Commonwealth
liable for its debts.82 It is this analysis enunciated in Specter which,
presumably, will be the future touchstone for determining immunity of Pennsylvania intrastate agencies and multi-state public corporations.
The implications of Specter on the sovereign immunity of interstate agencies, however, must be assessed with caution since the
decision might well be result-oriented, dictated more by impatience
with an old doctrine than by thoughtful analysis of its ramifications
on intrastate and multi-state agencies. 3 If the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, a one-state entity operating exclusively within
the geographic confines of the state and controlled ultimately by the
Pennsylvania legislature alone, is not considered "the Commonwealth" or its agency, then a multi-state agency, affected by the
constitutions and legislatures of more than one state and operating
without the boundaries of Pennsylvania, could hardly be considered
"the Commonwealth" or its agency for purposes of applying sovereign immunity. Yet this is precisely what the commonwealth court
decided in a 1976 case, Kennedy v. DelawareRiver Joint Toll Bridge
Commission.4 The court had to consider whether the Bridge Commission was covered by Pennsylvania',s sovereign immunity doctrine
and whether it was the "Commonwealth" within the meaning of the
Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act. The commonwealth court held
that the DRJTBC did fall under the Commonwealth's umbrella of
sovereign immunity. It based its decision on Anderson Appeal85 and
distinguished Specter on the grounds that the Specter decision was
81. Id. at 482-83, 341 A.2d at 485.
82. Id. at 493, 341 A.2d at 490.
83. Indeed, the Specter court made it clear that it remained of the opinion that only the
legislature could abolish sovereign immunity. Its decision was made in light of its "abrogation
of governmental immunity in Ayala and the trend in recent years to do away with immunities
from suit which are neither constitutionally nor statutorily compelled .
Id. at 479, 341
A.2d at 483.
84. 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 662, 354 A.2d 52 (1976).
85. Id. at 666, 354 A.2d at 54.
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based on the financial independence of the Turnpike Commission.
The court reasoned: "Although the legislature has chosen to give a
measure of independence to the defendant, its financial ties to the
Commonwealth s ' make Specter inapposite and dictate our holding
that the defendant is the 'Commonwealth' and is surrounded by the
cloak of sovereign immunity."87 By determining that the DRJTBC
was a commission of the Commonwealth for purposes of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, the commonwealth court concluded
that it had original jurisdiction.8"
FEDERAL LAW

A plaintiff may feel that a more satisfactory means of resolving
issues involving multi-state public corporations may be obtained in
federal court. 9 Before this is possible, however, he must pass several
hurdles. First, a jurisdictional basis must be asserted. 0 He might
allege that a federal question is involved when his case's central
issue concerns a federally approved compact; thus federal subject
matter jurisdiction should lie.9 But it has been generally held that
there is only federal question jurisdiction if the construction of a
clause in the compact is an issue raised by the plaintiff's complaint. It is not enough if the issue is merely one of interpreting the
86. The court pointed out that the DRJTBC received support from the Commonwealth
in maintaining bridges. It further distinguished Specter on the basis that the DRJTBC
"operates bridges owned by the two states, while the Turnpike Commission acquires and
maintains real property in its own name." Id. at 668, 354 A.2d at 55.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. It is possible that a state court will be more concerned with its state interests than
with protecting the national interests upon which the compact is founded. Comment, Federal
Question Jurisdiction to Interpret Interstate Compacts, 64 GEO. L.J. 87 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides: "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends . . ." See
C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTS 326-29 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
91. For an analysis of case law indicating that interstate compact issues are federal questions see Comment, supra note 89, at 88-101. Federal question jurisdiction is provided for by
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
92. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Yancoskie v. Delaware River
Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 725 (3d Cir. 1975).
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"sue and be sued" clause when immunity is raised as a defense. 3
Moreover, mere congressional approval of a compact does not raise
it to the level of a federal statute. 4 Courts have also been reluctant
to find subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the interstate
agency involves interstate commerce, 5 and the only remaining jurisdictional basis, diversity of citizenship," presents the additional
problem that a multi-state corporation must be considered a citizen
of each member state.97 Thus it may often be impossible to demonstrate the requisite diversity of parties."
Even if it is determined that the federal court has jurisdiction, it
must be resolved whether the agency is "the state" or its "alter
ego." If it is decided that the interstate agency is "the state," the
eleventh amendment 9 may bar a federal court from entertaining a
93. Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
94. Yancoskie v. Delaware River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 724-26 (3d Cir. 1975). But see
League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975) (interstate compact is a statute of the United States, thus
subject matter jurisdiction over disputes involving the interstate agency is conferred under
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)). See also Engdahl, Constructionof Interstate Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REv. 987 (1965); Comment, supra note 89, at 88-101.

95. Mere construction of an interstate bridgeor the agency's involvement in interstate
commerce is not enough to confer jurisdiction where the impingement of federal law is not a
part of the plaintiff's case, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), which reads: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under
any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints
and monopolies." The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Yancoskie v. Delaware
River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1975), that the "arising under" requirement
of § 1337 had not been met when the issue involved construction of an interstate compact.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens
of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens of different States
and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties."
97. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970), a corporation, for purposes of determining diversity
of citizenship, must be considered a citizen of "any State by which it has been incorporated
and of the State where it has its principal place of business.
... See Yancoskie v. Delaware
River Port Auth., 528 F.2d 722, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1975); 1 MOORE's FEDEAL PRACTICE 0.78[2],
at 723.50 (2d ed. 1976); WIurr, supra note 90, at 101-07.
98. An immediate impediment raised by the multiple citizenship of a corporation is that
in many cases it will not be able to meet the test of complete diversity between plaintiffs and
defendants required by the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
Another "potential impediment to diversity jurisdiction" is "that neither a state nor 'an arm
or alter ego' of the state is a 'citizen' for purposes of diversity." Comment, supra note 89, at
88 n.4, citing Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-18 (1973). This latter impediment
might be side-stepped if the agency has the power to sue and be sued. Comment, supra note
89, at 88 n.4.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides that "The judicial power of the United States shall
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suit against the agency. Eleventh amendment immunity is distinct
from a state's sovereign immunity; under federal law it is clear that
even if a state has waived its sovereign immunity, eleventh amendment immunity may still apply: express language or a clear indication from a state that it has waived the eleventh amendment's bar
would be necessary. 00 In Intracoastal Transportation,Inc. v. Decatur County,"' the court noted that a waiver could be found if: (1) a
state enters a field regulated by federal statute; (2) Congress has
specifically conferred the remedy to private parties for violations of
the applicable federal regulatory statute; and (3) Congress has expressly provided that a private remedy was applicable to the
states.0 2 In Red Star Towing & TransportationCo. v. Department
0 3
of Transportation,
the court found that the state had not waived
its immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment merely by
operating bridges spanning a navigable body of water and by engaging in interstate commerce. 04 The court held that since Congress
created no private cause of action for violations of the safety provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act,' 5 there was no waiver. 016
An analysis like that enunciated in Intracoastalhas not, however,
always been relied upon by the courts in resolving eleventh amendment immunity questions in the context of interstate compacts. In
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission,0 7 a 1959 case, a
waiver was found without any consideration even resembling such
an analysis. 08 In Petty, however, Congress had included a special
condition in the interstate compact before approving it that
"nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect, impair, or
not . . . extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State ....
100. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344
F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied sub nor. Meyers
v. Pennsylvania, 416 U.S. 946 (1974).
101. 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973).
102. Id. at 365. But see id. at 368 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
103. 423 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 105. Such activity is subject to federal regulation by the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
105. 423 F.2d at 105.
106. Id.
107. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
108. Id. at 278-79. The Petty case involved a suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1970), against a bi-state corporation established pursuant to a congressionally approved
compact which contained the standard "sue and be sued" clause.
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diminish any right, power, or jurisdiction of. . .any court . . . of
the United States over or in regard to any navigable water or any
commerce between the States . . . .'"' The case involved a suit
against a bi-state corporation established pursuant to the congressionally approved compact which contained the standard "sue and
be sued" clause. Although Petty generally speaks in terms of the
eleventh amendment, there is other wording in the case which
leaves in doubt whether the decision also refers to sovereign immunity. The Court stated that Congress "approved a sue-and-be-sued
clause in a compact under conditions that make it clear that the
States accepting it waived any immunity from suit which they otherwise might have." ' " Pointing out that a navigable river and interstate commerce were involved, the United States Supreme Court
said that this proviso, combined with the "sue and be sued" clause
in the compact, amounted to a waiver of the state's immunity."'
Taken together, Petty and Intracoastalsuggest that the actual language of an interstate compact should be closely examined to determine whether eleventh amendment immunity has been waived. Of
course, there is no eleventh amendment immunity problem if it is
determined that the agency is not "the state" or an agent of any of
the participating states."' Thus, determining whether the agency is
"the state" or its "alter ego" leads back to the analytical factors
encountered in the sovereign immunity discussion." 3 A particularly
important factor when the immunity issue is being decided for eleventh amendment purposes concerns the source of possible payment
for claims against the agency. In Urbano v. Board of Managers,",
the test used by the court was whether a damage payment would
come from the state treasury. Since it would not, the court concluded that the agency was not the state or its "alter ego" to be
shielded by the eleventh amendment."'
109. Id. at 281.
110. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 279-80.
112. In Bartron v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, 216 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1954),
a federal court in New Jersey held that the DRJTBC was not the state for jurisdictional
purposes, but merely a public corporation.
113. See notes 48-70 and accompanying text supra.
114. 415 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970).
115. Id. at 250-51; accord, Raymond Int'l Inc. v. The M/T Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). See Kennedy v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, No. 75-1650
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1976).
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If there is diversity jurisdiction and no eleventh amendment immunity, the federal court, under the Erie doctrine,"' sits as a diversity court and refers to the law of the forum state to resolve substantive issues." 7 Thus, once again the complicated question of how the
state courts will treat the agency with regard to state sovereign
immunity is faced. If the suit were to involve Pennsylvania, the
trend away from sovereign immunity might influence the federal
court's decision. In Kennedy v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge
Commission,"' a federal district court reviewed the reasoning of
Specter and stated-that "the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
conclude that the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission
may be sued for negligent maintenance and operation.""' 9 Yet, the
state supreme court has not yet spoken on the issue and presupposing its future treatment of the multi-state public corporation may
be unreliable. Indeed, a commonwealth court decision involving the
same parties' ° lobbies for treatment contrary to the federal court's
conclusion.
CONCLUSION

The resolution of issues-procedural and substantive-involving
interstate public corporations is a complicated, overlapping affair
that has produced a twisted, shifting body of uncertain law. A predominant issue in that confusion is the question of whether the
agency is "the state" and, if so, which state. A more comprehensible, consistent body of law might develop if the courts were to begin
regarding multi-state public corporations in light of their historical
bases, organizational structures, and purposes. Agencies formed by
interstate compacts are distinct entities, created to solve regional
problems of a diverse nature, and etiologically removed from any of
the participating states. Once created, they become totally separate
entities which should be neither controlled by nor subject to the
116. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal district court judges are
obliged in diversity cases to apply the law of the forum state).
117. See Pullman, Inc. v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also Harris v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1005
(1970).
118. No. 75-1650, (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1976).
119. Id. at 4.
120. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text supra.
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statutes or case law of any one state. State law should be used only
as one factor in resolving the legal issues raised by these agencies;
it should not be the sole criterion.
A comprehensible body of federal common law would seem the
better way to maintain logical and consistent case analysis, uniformity and measured national progression.' Divergent state court
results would be avoided by applying the federal law.' In federal
court, the initial jurisdictional dilemmas could be solved by simply
deciding that an interstate compact is a law of the United States
and by finding subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to a federal
question. 2 3 The need for court interpretation of the "sue and be
sued" clause could fulfill the "arising under" requirement. 24 This
approach, however, might not always be applicable where the action
is not found to directly "arise under" the interstate compact. Therefore, the surest way to prevent dismissal of the cases by federal
courts would be the enactment of a new United States Code provision, allowing for federal court jurisdiction whenever a multi-state
public corporation is a party to a suit. This might be accomplished
by an amendment to the federal question statute already in effect,' 25
or by promulgation of an entirely separate statutory section.
A signifiicant effect of such an amendment would be the avoidance of the problems of unclear state law, competing states' interests, and, possibly, eleventh amendment immunity. It would allow
for the development of the law of interstate compacts outside of the
parochialism of any one state. As a result, interstate compact law
would reflect the regional thrust which is the central basis of these
multi-state corporations.
121. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); League
to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
122. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 & n.4 (1959).
123. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra. See also League to Save Lake Tahoe
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 974
(1975).
124. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).

